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1 Introduction
In a friction-less credit market, firms that find it optimal to have bank debt in
their capital structure should be able to issue bank debt at a correct market price.
This correct price for debt (cost of debt) would depend on the incoming cash flow
as well as the risk of the firm’s future projects. In the real world, however, there
is an excess demand for loanable funds; i.e., certain firms apply for loans but fail
to receive them. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that potential borrowers who are
denied loans would not be able to borrow even if they indicated a willingness to pay
more than the market interest rate. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Colla et al.
(2013) also show that bank credit is indeed rationed and certain types of borrowers
end up with certain types of debt securities.
In the corporate finance literature, it is commonly assumed that information
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders may be reflected by premiums in in-
terest rates. This per se does not explain why some potential borrowers may fail
to find a lender. Furthermore, there are other models suggesting that information
frictions may be reflected in liquidity of funds. The literature, however, lacks mod-
els in which both liquidity distortions and price dispersions are allowed to operate
simultaneously1. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by proposing a model of
1Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide the first theoretical framework that justifies credit rationing
in equilibrium. They show that banks with imperfect information will formulate the terms of the
contract, specifically the interest rate, to attract low-risk borrowers. Willingness to lend at a higher
rate will attract riskier borrowers and the overall effect is value-destroying. In a similar environment
with information frictions, Bester (1985) shows that when we allow banks to post different contracts
to screen borrowers, credit rationing disappears. In an environment with only information frictions,
one cannot explain both credit rationing and price dispersion. We add search friction to a standard
environment with information frictions and show that a separating equilibrium with credit rationing
always exists.
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a credit market using the tools provided in the competitive search literature (i.e.,
Guerrieri et al. (2010)). We develop a model of a market with adverse selection and
search frictions, and show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which
each type of firm in need of bank credit applies to a different type of contract. In this
model, banks post the terms and conditions of credit agreements and potential bor-
rowers choose where to direct their search. Banks have imperfect information about
borrowers, and through the posted terms of trade they can attract certain types of
borrowers and screen out others. Contract terms and market tightness (i.e., ratio of
borrowers to lenders in each submarket) is public information. In this framework,
borrowers potentially face a trade-off between the terms of loans and market tight-
ness. In a benchmark setup of the model with no information frictions, we show the
properties of the offered loan contracts. In the second best version of the model with
information frictions on the borrowers’ side, we show how private information dis-
torts the terms of loan contracts. Competitive search frictions allow us to investigate
the effects of private information on two margins: 1- the extensive margin of loan
contracts: the number of matched agents and offered loans is identified by the tight-
ness in each submarket. 2- the intensive margin of the loan contracts: the amount
of loans offered may be distorted downward when we add information problems to
the model.
In the rest of the paper, we provide empirical evidence on the findings in the
theoretical part of this paper. Using a novel dataset that records successful and
unsuccessful applications for bank credit as well as the conditions of each credit
agreement and firm characteristics, we verify the co-existence of unmatched credit
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seekers and distribution in types of contracts. This finding has two immediate impli-
cations. First, there is a difference between a desired capital structure and a realized
one. There are two types of firms whose capital structure does not have bank debt:
firms that prefer to not have a bank loan and firms that prefer to have a bank loan
but are unsuccessful in acquiring it. Even if a firm is successful in obtaining bank
debt, due to restrictions on the supply side, the amount of debt obtained might
be different from what is desired. Due to the lack of data on unsuccessful bank
loan applications, empirical banking studies may ignore this difference and explain
debt structure solely as a function of firm characteristics. Using data on a large
cross-section of firms, we investigate the magnitude of this issue. We provide empir-
ical evidence that potential borrowers exist who are unsuccessful in acquiring bank
loans even if they are willing to pay higher interest rates, a point ignored or at best
acknowledged based on anecdotal evidence in prior work.
Our paper also relates to the recent literature on corporate debt structure and
debt heterogeneity. Rauh and Sufi (2010) and Colla et al. (2013) show that different
borrowers specialize in certain types of debt. Furthermore, the degree and type of
specialization varies widely across different firm types measured by size, degree of
information asymmetry, maturity, profitability, etc., a finding that is also confirmed
in our study. In analyzing debt specialization, Colla et al. (2013) extend the work of
Rauh and Sufi (2010), who use a sample of 305 randomly selected rated public U.S
firms for the period 1996 to 2006 by studying a sample of 3,296 U.S. public firms from
2002 to 2009. This number includes all the firms with available financial data on both
Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database and the Compustat database. Our study
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complements these two papers by taking advantage of the European Commission’s
EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) database. This data is based on a
survey of 15,000 manufacturing firms. This data helps us deepen our understanding
of capital structure beyond prior findings in this area, especially since it includes
rich data on the borrowing behaviour of private firms. Studying private firm-bank
relationships is important because private firms have limited access to public funds,
and as a result, acquiring bank loans is crucial for them. Furthermore, since the level
of information asymmetry between lenders and private borrowers is higher, the role
of search frictions in forming capital structure is more clearly demonstrated. Also,
as mentioned earlier, this dataset provides additional insight by including data on
unsuccessful bank loan applications.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data
and empirical evidence. Section 3 provides the theoretical model. In this section,
we develop the general environment, define equilibrium, and solve constrained opti-
mization problems with and without borrower-specific information frictions. Section
4 concludes this article. Proofs for the solutions in theoretical models are relegated
to the appendix.
2 Data and Evidence
We start with 14,759 European firms with available data on the EFIGE database2.
EFIGE was primarily created to “examine the pattern of internationalization of
2EFIGE stands for “European Firms in Global Economy: internal policies for external com-
petitiveness”; it is supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commission
through its 7th Framework Programme and coordinated by Bruegel, a European think tank.
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European firms” by the European Commission. The database provides firm-level
quantitative and qualitative information on about 150 items ranging from R&D and
innovation, labour organisation, financing and organisational activities, and pricing
behaviour. It is designed to be a representative sample of manufacturing firms in
seven European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria,
Hungary). Data was collected in 2010 through survey questionnaires, covering the
years from 2007 to 2009. Data gathered through surveys were validated by assessing
the comparability of the survey data with official statistics3. We focus on the part
of this database that is dedicated to firms’ financing activities. Table 1 and Table 2
report descriptive statistics on the distribution of surveyed firms by country, industry,
and size classes (extracted from Altomonte and Aquilante (2012)).
Table 1: Distribution of firms by country and size class
Class Size AUT FRA GER HUN ITA SPA UK Total
Employees (10-19) 132 1,001 701 149 1,040 1,036 635 4,694
Employees (20-49) 168 1,150 1,135 176 1,407 1,244 805 6,085
Employees (50-249) 97 608 793 118 429 406 519 2,970
Employees (over 250) 46 214 306 45 145 146 108 1,010
Total 443 2,973 2,935 488 3,021 2,832 2,067 14,759
The first relevant survey question for our research is “Did your firm recur to
external financing in the period 2008-2009? By external financing we mean funds
not generated internally (i.e., not [through] self-financing)”. Possible responses are
“Yes,” “No,” and “DK/DA” (Do not know/Did not answer)4. A follow-up question
3For more information see Altomonte and Aquilante (2012) or visit www.efige.org.
4In general respondent firms agreed to a minimum response rate of 70% of 15 important ques-
tions and an overall average of response rate not below 60% for the remaining part of the question-
naire (135 questions)
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Table 2: Distribution of firms by country and NACE2 industries
Industry AUT FRA GER HUN ITA SPA UK Total
15 32 212 350 62 238 463 147 1,504
17 8 118 77 7 196 46 52 504
18 5 55 17 17 109 50 42 295
19 0 32 13 4 115 47 10 221
20 21 93 103 17 88 212 89 623
21 10 83 62 16 71 27 47 316
22 34 148 215 27 105 100 208 837
24 5 102 95 20 108 121 104 555
25 22 226 192 40 169 148 122 919
26 18 153 94 30 167 163 56 681
27 13 68 58 7 76 68 54 344
28 70 839 510 101 611 580 301 3,012
29 48 249 503 68 381 305 208 1,762
31 20 121 134 19 152 66 124 636
32 5 94 56 9 49 25 101 339
33 15 58 192 6 71 25 80 447
34 6 73 41 11 47 64 33 275
35 2 16 20 3 33 42 21 137
36 5 16 172 18 211 258 258 938
Total 339 2,756 2,904 482 2,997 2,810 2,057 14,345
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is: “Have firms actually increased the total amount of external financing over that
period?”. In Table 3, we show that 43.0% of 14,759 firms (6,344 firms) sought for
external financing during 2008-2009. Out of this number, 2,692 firms (42.4%) indeed
increased the total amount of external financing and 3,636 firms (57.3%) were not
successful in raising external financing.
Table 3: Distribution of firms in need of external financing
Asked for External Financing Raised External Financing
Number Percentage of Total Number Percentage
Yes 2,692 42.4%
Yes 6,344 43.0% No 3,636 57.3%
DN/DK 16 0.3%
Total 6,344 100.0%
No 7,856 53.2%
DN/DK 556 3.8%
Total 14,759 100.0%
Table 4 shows the breakdown of the type of financial instrument used as a means
of external financing. Of the 2,692 firms who succeeded in raising external financing,
16% (430 firms) used equity; only 3% (81 firms) relied on venture capital (VC) and
private equity financing (PE); whereas 45.3% (1,220 firms) and 72.5% (1,952 firms)
relied on short-term and medium- or long-term bank credit, respectively. This result
confirms a heavy reliance of the European economy on bank financing as opposed to
VC/PE financing. However, this result should be interpreted with caution as firms
with less than 10 employees (which is more likely to include entrepreneurial firms
and start-ups) are excluded from the data. Table 4 also shows that firms use other
types of external financing, such as financial securities, public funds, tax incentives,
leasing or factoring, and other (3.2%, 8.4%, 4.5%, 29.5% and 10.4% of all the firms
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in the sample, respectively). In the rest of this section, we focus on the firm-bank
relationship and bank credit rationing.
Table 4: Type of financial instrument used for external financing
Number Percentage
Equity 430 16.0%
Venture capital and private equity 81 3.0%
Short-term bank credit 1,220 45.3%
Medium or long term bank credit 1,952 72.5%
Securities 86 3.2%
Public funds 226 8.4%
Tax incentives 120 4.5%
Leasing or factoring 794 29.5%
Other financing methods 279 10.4%
The most direct way of detecting credit rationing is through knowing who the
unsuccessful credit seekers are and identifying the price they were willing to pay
to obtain credit. Regulatory authorities around the world normally do not require
firms to report unsuccessful bank loan applications. Also, there is no comprehensive
data collected from the supply side (i.e., banks) that provide the details of denied
corporate loans. We believe the EFIGE database can be used to provide new insights
into the mechanism of credit rationing in the corporate loan market.
Surveyed firms were asked “During the last year, did the firm apply for more
credit?” In table 5, we show that out of the 2,710 firms who responded to this
question, 1,997 (73.7%) indicated they applied for more credit, however only 1,407
firms (70.4%) were successful in obtaining credit. Table 5 also shows that out of the
29.6% of unsuccessful applicants, almost everyone (98.5%) was willing to borrow at
the interest rate that they currently pay or the rate they previously paid and 60.7%
9
(358 applicants) indicated they were prepared to borrow at a higher rate of interest
if needed.
10
T
ab
le
5:
S
u
cc
es
sf
u
l
an
d
u
n
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
cr
ed
it
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s
D
id
th
e
fi
rm
ap
p
ly
fo
r
m
or
e
cr
ed
it
?
N
u
m
b
er
(%
a
)
W
a
s
th
e
fi
rm
su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
N
u
m
b
er
(%
b
)
W
a
s
th
e
fi
rm
w
il
li
n
g
to
in
cr
ea
se
b
o
rr
ow
in
g
a
t
th
e
sa
m
e
ra
te
o
f
in
te
re
st
?
N
u
m
b
er
(%
c
)
W
a
s
th
e
fi
rm
p
re
p
a
re
d
to
in
cr
ea
se
b
o
rr
ow
in
g
a
t
a
h
ig
h
er
ra
te
o
f
in
te
re
st
?
N
u
m
b
er
(%
d
)
Y
es
1
,4
0
7
(7
0
.4
%
)
N
o
5
9
0
(2
9
.6
%
)
Y
es
5
8
1
(9
8
.5
%
)
Y
es
3
5
8
(6
0
.7
%
)
Y
es
1,
9
9
7
(7
3.
7
%
)
N
o
0
(0
.0
%
)
N
o
2
3
0
(3
9
.0
%
)
D
K
/
D
Y
9
(1
.5
%
)
D
K
/
D
Y
2
(0
.3
%
)
T
o
ta
l
5
9
0
(1
0
0
.0
%
)
T
o
ta
l
5
9
0
(1
0
0
.0
%
)
T
o
ta
l
1
,9
9
7
(1
0
0
.0
%
)
N
o
71
3
(2
6.
3%
)
T
ot
al
N
u
m
b
er
of
R
es
p
on
d
en
ts
2,
7
1
0
(1
00
.0
%
)
a
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
b
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
c
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
in
su
cc
es
s
ca
te
g
o
ry
d
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
in
su
cc
es
s
ca
te
g
o
ry
11
We next focus on the screening process of credit applications. In the theoretical
part of this paper, we show that banks screen borrowers by posting contracts with
certain terms and conditions and by requiring certain types of information from po-
tential borrowers. Their goal is to attract specific groups of borrowers by making it
difficult for others to apply. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on the distribu-
tion of the type of information and guarantees required in credit applications. We
divide firms that apply for bank credit into three groups: 1. firms with successful
applications; 2. firms with unsuccessful applications that were not willing to pay a
higher interest rate; and 3. firms with unsuccessful applications that were willing
to pay a higher interest rate. We exclude the two unsuccessful firms (Table 5) for
which their willingness to pay a higher rate is not known. We also divide terms and
conditions into two main groups: First, the information that banks required from
potential borrowers in order to process their application, and second, the type of
guarantee or collateral that borrowers were asked to provide. Information required
includes these seven categories: collateral, balance sheet information, interviews with
management on firm’s policy and prospects, business plan and firms’ targets, his-
torical records of payments and debt service, brand recognition, and other. The
types of guarantee/collateral required include five categories: personal guarantees
from the person who manages or owns the firm, guarantees on assets belonging to
the firm, guarantees on assets of the group the firm belongs to, third party collateral
(i.e., by a consortium, etc.), and other collaterals. The number and percentage of
loan contracts in each firm category that are subject to each term and condition are
presented. For instance, Table 6 shows that under “Information Required,” 61.5%,
12
77.0% and 79.3% of loans applied for by successful applicants, unsuccessful appli-
cants not willing to pay a higher rate, and unsuccessful applicants willing to pay a
higher rate, respectively, were required to provide information on some sort of col-
lateral. Also, as an example under “Type of Guarantee/Collateral Required”, it is
shown that personal guarantees from the person who manages or owns the firm were
required for 39.7%, 53.5% and 54.7% of loans applied for by successful applicants,
unsuccessful applicants not willing to pay a higher rate and unsuccessful applicants
willing to pay a higher rate, respectively. In addition to providing statistics on the
conditions of acquiring loans, Table 6 also shows that denied loans were more difficult
to acquire originally, as applicants have to provide more guarantees and collaterals
at the time of loan applications.
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To sum up, we provide evidence on two issues: first, the existence of credit
rationing in the corporate loan market, that is, the existence of excess demand for
loanable funds. Our results demonstrate that there are indeed potential borrowers in
need of bank credit who are willing to pay a higher interest rate but their applications
are denied. This implies that firms are rationed by the lenders in the corporate
loan market. Second, we provide evidence on the heterogeneity that exists in the
corporate loan market in the terms and conditions of loans and also in the information
required in the screening process of loan applications. In the next section we provide
a theoretical model that includes these two observations.
3 Theoretical Model
There is a measure one of borrowers. Measure 0 < pi1 < 1 of these borrowers
are type 1, and the remaining (pi2 = 1 − pi1) are type 2 agents. Each period has
three subperiods: matching, loan, and repayment. Borrowers have access to measure
one of Lucas trees with stochastic return. Lucas trees produce fruits on the last
subperiod (repayment). A type i = 1, 2 borrower receives R units of fruit in the
repayment subperiod with probability pi, where p1 < p2, and with probability 1− pi
this borrower receives 0 fruit. There is a large measure of ex ante homogeneous
lenders who may decide to enter the market. If they decide to enter the market, they
incur k > 0 in the fixed cost of entering. Lenders can produce in the loan subperiod
and they incur c(q) cost when they produce q units. Borrowers cannot produce in
the loan subperiod and their utility of consuming q is u(q). We assume u′() > 0,
15
u′′() < 0, c′() > 0, and c′′() > 0.
Lenders post contracts in the frictional loan market and each borrower directs
his search to a single submarket. Contracts are observable by all participants in the
market. Each contract is a loan amount (q) and a repayment level (x). The fraction
of lenders to borrowers in each submarket is called tightness and is represented by θ.
In each submarket, borrowers and lenders match according to a matching function.
Each borrower is matched with a lender with probability µ(θ), where µ′() > 0 and
µ′′() < 05. Each lender matches with a borrower with probability η(θ) = µ(θ)
θ
, where
η(θ) is nonincreasing. Timing of the events is shown in Figure 1
RepaymentMatching Loan
Lenders enter
Matched lenders
produce q
Borrowers learn
their type Matched borrowers
consume q
Lenders post
contracts
Fruit production Repayment
Borrowers choose
submarkets
Consumption
Figure 1: Timing of the events
3.1 First best
Here, we assume borrowers’ types are common knowledge. Similar to Guerrieri
et al. (2010), instead of solving the competitive search equilibrium directly, we solve
a set of optimization problems for each type. Maximization problems in 1 show how
5The concavity assumption on the matching function is a standard assumption in many models
with search frictions. For a survey on the properties of matching functions, see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001).
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the optimal contract is chosen.
U i=1,2 = max
θ,q,x
µ(θ)[u(q) + pi(R− x)]
st. η(θ)(−c(q) + pix) ≥ k (1)
In the optimization problem for each type, market tightness (θ), loan amount
(q), and repayment level (x) are chosen to maximize the expected utility of each
type subject to the bank making nonnegative profits when only type i borrowers
apply. A borrower’s expected profit is the probability that he matches (µ(θ)) times
his expected return given that he finds a match. If he finds a match, he will enjoy
u(q) in utility of consuming the loan. At the repayment period, a matched borrower
pays back x of his fruits, if his tree yields any.
A lender’s expected profit conditional on entering is her matching probability
(η(θ)) times her expected profit. Her expected profit is her expected fruit collection in
the repayment period, and she suffers (c(q)) when giving out loans. Here, we assume
that R is large enough such that the constraint R > x is not binding. Later we will
show the specific minimum value for R that guarantees a nonbinding constraint.
The constraint in problem 1 is binding:
xi =
k
piη(θ)
+
c(q)
pi
i = 1, 2 (2)
Substitute in the objective function, and the problem becomes
17
U i=1,2 = max
θ,q
µ(θ)u(q) + µ(θ)piR− θk − µ(θ)c(q) (3)
The first order condition for qi is:
u′(q∗i ) = c
′(q∗i ) (4)
q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗
Note that q∗ is the first best amount of lending in an environment with no frictions.
This result shows that without information frictions, search frictions do not distort
the optimal amount of loans. As seen in equation 2, search frictions may distort the
repayment levels. The amount of loan is also independent of borrowers’ types. The
first order condition for θi gives the first best market tightness for each submarket:
µ′(θ∗i ) =
k
u(q∗)− c(q∗) + piR (5)
Using the concavity property of the matching function, we can see that θ∗2 < θ
∗
1.
Additionally, equation 2 shows that x∗2 < x
∗
1. The market for high-type borrowers
is tight comparing to the low-type borrowers, but high-type borrowers pay a lower
interest rate. Without information frictions, search frictions only affect the number
of successful matches through market tightness in different submarkets. There is
no credit rationing along the intensive margin in the loan market: the amounts of
offered loans are the same for high-type and low-type borrowers.
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The lowest value for R such that the constraint R > x is nonbinding is R∗min =
max{x∗1, x∗2}, where x∗i is the first best value for repayment level
x∗i =
k
piη(θ∗)
+
c(q∗)
pi
i = 1, 2 (6)
Therefore, the constraint in problem 1 is R > R∗min.
3.2 Private information
Let us assume borrowers’ types are their private information. Similar to Guerrieri
et al. (2010), agents with the lowest type (type 1) do not face incentive compatibil-
ity constraints. Therefore, their problem is similar to the first best with complete
information. We can find the market tightness that they face, their loan amount,
and their repayment level by solving the following first best problem:
U1 = max
θ,q,x
µ(θ)[u(q) + p1(R− x)]
st. η(θ)(−c(q) + p1x) ≥ k (7)
In a type 2 optimization problem they face an incentive compatibility constraint:
compared to type 2 contracts, type 1 contracts should be more attractive for a type
19
1 borrower.
U2 = max
θ,q,x
µ(θ)[u(q) + p2(R− x)]
st. η(θ)(−c(q) + p2x) ≥ k
µ(θ)(u(q) + p1(R− x)) ≤ U1 (8)
In 8 we use the binding participation constraint to eliminate x and the problem
becomes
U2 = max
θ,q
µ(θ)u(q) + p2Rµ(θ)− θk − µ(θ)c(q)
µ(θ)u(q) + µ(θ)p1R− θp1
p2
k − µ(θ)p1
p2
c(q) ≤ U1 (9)
The algorithm to solve the type 2 problem is to first solve the first best problem
without the incentive compatibility constraint. Then, we can check whether the solu-
tion for a type 2 borrower (q∗, θ∗2, x
∗
2) satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint.
If the solution satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint then information prob-
lems do not distort the type 2 problem and we get the first best. The allocations are
efficient.
If the solution to the first best problem for a type 2 borrower (q∗, θ∗2, x
∗
2) does
not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint in problem 9, we have to solve the
above constrained optimization problem (8).
Proposition 1. The amount of loan received by the good type (type 2) under binding
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private information is less than the amount they receive in the first best case
q2 < q
∗
2 = q
∗
The proof of the above proposition is in the appendix. The above proposition
shows that the information problem intensifies credit rationing. Search friction gen-
erates credit rationing in the extensive margin of the loan contracts: the number
of matched agents and offered loans is identified by the market tightness in each
submarket, and market tightness may be distorted upward or downward6. Informa-
tion problems affect both the extensive margin and the intensive margin of the loan
contracts: the amount of loans offered may be distorted downward when we add the
information problem to the model.
3.3 Existence and uniqueness
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follow from the assumed pref-
erence and payoff structure. Guerrieri et al. (2010) show that under very mild as-
sumptions on preferences and payoffs, this problem has a unique equilibrium. These
assumptions are met here. Assumptions A1 and A2 hold because the assumed pref-
erences are monotone, and also the contract allows transfers. We have the single
crossing property here, therefore the sorting assumption A3 is met too. As a result a
6In problem 8, we can use the binding free entry condition to eliminate x. The first order
condition for θ gives
µ′(θ2) =
k
[ 1−κ
1−κ p1p2
]u(q2)− c(q2) + p2R
where κ is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. Then it is straightforward to
show that compared to θ∗, θ2 may be distorted upward or downward.
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unique equilibrium always exists. Note that the nonexistence in the adverse selection
problems is resolved here7.
3.4 A model with multiple types
In previous sections, we developed a simple model with two types of borrowers to
prove the main properties in the cases with and without private information. Here
we generate the above model to include multiple types of borrowers. This version
of the model will generate multiple submarkets, but the basic intuition of the model
and the results are the same as before. Let us assume we have a measure 1 of agents
and a fraction pii > 0 of them are type i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ I. The setup of the model
is the same as in the previous section with pi > pj for i > j. In the case without
private information the setup of the model and the results are exactly the same as
before.
In the case with private information the problem of the type 1 agent is the same
as in 7. The problem of a type i > 1 agent is
U i = max
θ,q,x
µ(θ)[u(q) + pi(R− x)]
st. η(θ)(−c(q) + pix) ≥ k
µ(θ)(u(q) + pj(R− x)) ≤ U j i > j (10)
7Comparing to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium always exists here. As Guerrieri et al.
(2010) state :“...a key difference in our paper is that matching is bilateral and that each principal
can serve at most one agent. This can create distortions along the extensive margin and implies
that principals must form expectations about which agents are most attracted to a contract.”
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The solution algorithm for the above optimization problems is similar to that
presented in the previous sections. First we solve the first best problem for the type
1 agents. Then we use the maximized value for a type 1 agent (U1) to solve the
problem of a type 2 agent and continue the process until we solve the problem of all
of the agents. Again, information problems do not distort the choices of the lowest
types (type 1), however choices of higher type agents (i > 1) may be distorted in
cases with private information.
4 Concluding remarks
If the price mechanism works then we should not observe credit rationing in cor-
porate loan markets. Using a novel dataset on a large sample of European firms
seeking external financing, we show that credit rationing indeed exists. Out of 1,997
firms that apply for more bank credit, 590 firms (29.6%) cannot obtain any. The
application by 60.7% of these firms (358 firms) was denied in spite of them being
prepared to borrow at a higher rate of interest. We also show that banks provide
credit agreements with different terms and conditions. In addition, they screen po-
tential borrowers by requiring various information and guarantees during the process
of loan application.
The corporate finance literature clearly lacks models in which both credit ra-
tioning and distribution in the terms and conditions of loans are allowed to operate
simultaneously. To fill this gap, we present a simple model of credit market with
adverse selection and search frictions. In this model, banks post the terms and con-
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ditions of credit agreements and potential borrowers with private information choose
where to direct their search. In equilibrium, banks post separating contracts. The
terms and conditions of each contract serve as a device by which lenders induce bor-
rowers to self-select across credit sub-markets. This leads to a number of findings.
First, in equilibrium, there exists certain firms in need of bank credit that remain un-
matched. Second, the credit market becomes segmented into different “sub-markets,”
and each sub-market attracts certain types of borrowers.
Our work suggests several directions for further research. First, our finding that
a significant fraction of firms fail to achieve their desired capital structure suggests
that studies that link realized capital structure to firms’ characteristics and even
firms’ unobserved heterogeneity are not complete unless they account for frictions
in the credit market. In the empirical part of this paper, we focus on the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in bank-firm relationships and variations in capital structure.
It will be useful to study the impact of various credit supply shocks and regimes
over time on the evolution of capital structure and heterogeneity in debt contracts.
Another interesting research idea is how the deviation of realized capital structure
from the desired capital structure of firms changes over time as a result of shocks
in the supply of credit. Understanding how search frictions work in credit markets
requires collecting a time-series of successful and unsuccessful bank loan applications
as well as the terms and conditions of the granted and denied loan agreements.
Second, our treatment of credit agreement focuses on a simple contract that only
includes interest rate. Another possible venue of future research is to extend the
theoretical part of this paper and examine the joint determination of the amounts,
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rates, and guarantees of credit agreements in each sub-market.
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Appendix
A Proof for proposition 1
The constraint problem is the following
U2 = max
θ,q,x
µ(θ)[u(q) + p2(R− x)]
st. η(θ)(−c(q) + p2x) ≥ k
µ(θ)(u(q) + p1(R− x)) ≤ U1 (11)
Let us call the Lagrangian multipliers of the above constraints λ and ν. The solution
for these multipliers are
λ = θ
p2
p1
− 1
p2
p1
− c′(q2)
u′(q2)
(12)
ν = µ(θ)
p2(1− c′(q2)u′(q2))
p1(
p2
p1
− c′(q2)
u′(q2)
)
(13)
We are interested in cases where multipliers are positive. Therefore, from 12
p2
p1
>
c′(q2)
u′q2
Moreover, from 13
c′(q2)
u′(q2)
< 1
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and using curvature properties of u() and c() we can see that
q2 < q
∗
2
27
References
Altomonte, Carlo and Tommaso Aquilante (2012) “The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-
unicredit dataset,”Technical report. 2
Bester, Helmut (1985) “Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect
information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 850–855. 1
Colla, Paolo, Filippo Ippolito, and Kai Li (2013) “Debt specialization,” The Journal
of Finance, pp. –. 1
Faulkender, Michael and Mitchell A Petersen (2006) “Does the source of capital
affect capital structure?” Review of financial studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 45–79. 1
Guerrieri, Veronica, Robert Shimer, and Randall Wright (2010) “Adverse Selection
in Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Econometrica, Vol. 78, No. 6, pp. 1823–1862.
1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 7
Petrongolo, Barbara and Christopher A Pissarides (2001) “Looking into the black
box: A survey of the matching function,” Journal of Economic literature, Vol. 39,
No. 2, pp. 390–431. 5
Rauh, Joshua D and Amir Sufi (2010) “Capital structure and debt structure,” Review
of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 12, pp. 4242–4280. 1
Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz (1976) “Equilibrium in competitive insurance
markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information,” The quarterly
journal of economics, pp. 629–649. 7
28
Stiglitz, Joseph E and Andrew Weiss (1981) “Credit rationing in markets with im-
perfect information,” The American economic review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 393–410.
1
29
